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Abstract 
 
This research challenges the contemporary view of economic policy makers in transition 
European economies that the EU integration process will lead to a greater inflow of Foreign 
Direct Investments (FDI), thereby increasing living standards. With the Brexit referendum, the 
integration of the EU has been threatened by a distressing existential question: is EU 
membership valuable for transition countries if even developed countries (like the UK) vote to 
leave or decided not to align like Switzerland and Norway in the past? Our analysis considers 
the success of several countries in Eastern Europe in attracting and benefiting from FDI on their 
way to EU membership. Analyzing a 13-year panel data of 16 transition countries, we found no 
statistically significant positive association between FDI inflow and EU accession. We argue, 
that it is also important to consider the welfare for domestic economies that can emerge from 
those investments. We illustrate this through the case study of a successful combination of 
institutional development and local content policies implementation accompanied by sufficient 
FDI inflows in a non-EU country - Kazakhstan.  
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1. Introduction 
 
It has been more than two decades since former command economies started their transition to 
market economies, believing that replicating certain policies of developed countries would make 
them developed too. Unfortunately, this idea was too simplified, and impossible in reality. As 
economic reforms continued, it was more and more obvious that application did not fit the socio-
economic system of transition countries. The judiciary system was strongly influenced by ruling 
political parties that tailored privatization of state-owned enterprises according to their personal 
needs, so national resources often become privately owned overnight (Berend, 2009). All of this 
make transition economies specific in terms of potential benefits that they could exploit from 
FDI. 
The basic premise in the new neoliberal concept of economic reforms was the necessity 
to radically abolish trade barriers and liberalize FDI policies, as well as deregulate capital 
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markets. There was no promise that this would bring economic growth or social welfare. As a 
matter of fact, scholars like Stiglitz (2000) warned that countries with weak legal framework and 
decades of command economy would suffer disastrous effects of such radical implementation 
of neoliberal policies. Former socialist economies understood transition as a deregulation but 
that does not mean no rules at all. The process of market formation required a whole set of new 
institutions that did not exist before.  These include laws that regulate bankruptcy, protect 
competition, rules for banking, mortgage, privatization, intellectual property rights etc. Stiglitz 
(2000). All of these regulations in transition countries came into implementation too late. 
Because of differences in the stage of economic and institutional development between 
developed and developing countries, FDI also affects them differently. 
As Berend (2009) noted, the attitude of transition countries towards FDI had been 
hostile for a long time. Under the socialist economic order, foreign investments and foreign 
capital considered as a threat to national security and social order, which was quite an extreme 
view. Since the market reforms started, the view about FDI changed completely and went to 
another extreme. Economic policy viewed FDI as a source of, inevitably, positive influence on 
the economy.  
Moreover, the prevailing dogma, in the transition region, suggested that integration into 
the EU would lead to the greater inflow of FDI (Stosic et al. 2011; Bitzenis, 2013). The main 
logic behind this assumption is that countries which are on the way to the EU membership have 
to adopt EU legislation that otherwise would not have been adopted. This, as shown below, is 
quite a simplified view as some countries in Central Asia adopt EU legislation even though they 
are far from the EU. 
We have chosen the case of Kazakhstan to illustrate our arguments for a number of 
reasons: 
- The wealth of nations today has to do with a path which a society has chosen in the 
past. We would like to consider a country with a similar path, i.e. a transition country which is 
changing from a centrally planned to a market economy.  
- Kazakhstan‘s population is similar to the combined population of South-Eastern 
European (SEE) countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia, and Slovenia), which were part of ex-Yugoslavia. 
- Kazakhstan has a strategic position between the EU and China, yet it is not about to 
become the EU member. 
- Finally, we have chosen a non-European country, which has demonstrated strong 
economic growth and institutional development in the recent years, in order to dissect EU 
effects.   
It is also believed that institutional stabilization (economic and political) is driven by the 
necessity to fulfill EU requirements. Strong institutions (which mean low corruption and high 
transparency) are assumed to be the result of EU integration Tintin (2011), and also to lead to 
the inflow of FDI which inevitably has positive developmental effects. Therefore, there is a 
legitimate need to raise the question (1) of correlation between institutional development (that is 
considered to positively influence FDI inflows) and the EU integration process, and question (2) 
about the assumed positive developmental effects of FDI in a transition region. 
We argue that positive developmental effects of FDI are far from appearing 
automatically and that the ability of transition countries to facilitate FDI with high spillover 
potential is the focal point in the process the attraction of FDI. Moreover, we argue that 
economic policies concerning FDI should follow the rule of three: (1) attraction, (2) embodiment 
and (3) aftercare. As further research will show, transition countries mainly focus on the first 
step-attraction of FDI, believing that once MNEs set up their operation and employ labor, 
governments should not engage anymore. 
It is difficult to assume that transition countries can attract FDI with high spillover 
potential without developing local capabilities and therefore using strategies involving the 
implementation of industrial policies such as local content development policies or performance 
requirements. Although there are some arguments that performance requirements have 
deployed inefficiently in many countries (Hufbauer and Schott, 2015), there are also examples 
of infant industry protection where performance requirements have been used effectively 
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(Chang, 2003). In order to illustrate successful local content development policy implementation 
accompanied by sufficient FDI inflow, we consider the case of Kazakhstan. 
 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
2.1. Location Determinants of FDI 
 
There is a growing interest in the literature about the role of FDI in economic development, 
developing countries. In order to consider the relevance of the EU integration process for 
institutional development and FDI, we need to understand how and why companies 
internationalize. In addition, it is necessary to analyze the process of institutional development 
in transition countries from a theoretical point of view, in order to understand external factors 
that might influence this process. 
The literature on FDI is supportive of this type of investment mainly because of positive 
expectations, which are related not only to the inflow of capital itself but more importantly to the 
inflow of new technologies, managerial knowledge and presumably investments in human 
capital. It is suggested that FDI can contribute to the host country economy in the long run.  
I order to explain why companies would make foreign investments and not in any other 
form of internationalization, Buckley and Casson (1976) introduced an internalization theory and 
Dunning (1980) built upon this concept and developed the eclectic framework. Those two 
concepts become the foundation of the theory of MNEs. Dunning‘s (1980) eclectic framework 
provides a means of analyzing FDI more comprehensively. This framework is based on the idea 
of three principal advantages of MNEs - Ownership, Location, and Internalization, also called 
the OLI framework- drive internationalization of production. It analyses correlation of the three 
advantages at the industry level: successful internationalization is dependent on a core 
competitive advantage, host country location endowments, and the ability to internalize sources 
of competitive advantage. The explanation provided by the eclectic framework allows for a 
better understanding of the MNEs‘ motives, and abilities to engage in production in foreign 
countries. 
According to the eclectic framework, whichever is the motive for the internationalization 
of production (efficiency, market, resource or asset seeking) companies must develop core 
competencies (ownership advantages), in the home market. These are portrayed in specific 
tangible assets like specific technology, managerial practices, and sources of finance, as well 
as intangible assets like reputation, organization and employee skills. However, whether 
ownership advantages are efficiently exploited which is very much dependent on the location 
characteristics of the host country. In other words, the location advantages of the host country 
compensate for the home market deficiency. These can be larger market size, availability of 
skilled human capital, and natural resources or institutional stability. 
Some researchers, like Baldwin (1969) or Damijan et al. (2013), add EU membership as 
an important determinant for FDI. On the other hand, Cristina and Cantemir (2012) have 
examined attractiveness indexes of public policies for FDI in CEE countries, and found that the 
increase of the FDI per capita since the EU accession years is, at least partially, due to the 
increasing attractiveness of the public policies, like state subsidies (Bellak and Leibrecht, 2005). 
The beneficiary are those countries that improve the infrastructure, the institutions‘ quality and 
labour market conditions (Demekas et al. 2007). However, the question whether this 
improvement is the result of EU accession, or just the result of efforts of the governments to 
attract FDI with subsidies, or the result of privatization, remains unanswered in this paper. 
Radulescu and Jianu (2011) analyzed Romania and Spain‘s entry into the EU and did 
not find any positive relationship between EU accession and inward FDI. A number of studies 
like Narula and Bellak (2008) have illustrated that relying only on market size and low wages is 
no longer a factor that determines the attraction of FDI. It is rather a strong institutional 
framework, which is the key factor of success.  
However, as we can see, theoretical grounding does not recognize this type of location 
advantage. Membership in the EU per se will not make a country‘s labor cheaper, its natural 
resources richer or technologies more advanced. What it might be related to the market size, as 
member states are also part of the European Economic Area, which enlarges their market 
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(Brenton et al. 1999). At the same time, this is also the case with other non-EU countries in 
Europe and around the world, which has free trade agreements with the EU, for example, South 
Korea, Norway or Israel. 
 
2.2. The Relevance of Institutional Efficiency for the Attraction of FDI 
 
The institutional theory explains that firm behavior is determined by the external institutional 
environment which includes formal institutions such as law, regulations and rules, and informal 
institutions such as norms, cultures, and ethics. North (1990) defined institutions as the rules of 
the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape 
economic interaction. Thus, institutions create an environment within which economic 
transactions are undertaken.  
The institutional theory emerged from two streams of economic thoughts: first, the idea 
that the state defines a legal framework, which ensures that market economy functions, and 
second, that transactions cost theory explaining that economic organizations manage 
themselves in order to reduce costs associated with economic transactions, which are 
influenced by the institutions governing the market. Without a stable institutional framework, 
transaction costs may become so high, that certain transactions are not undertaken at all (Peng 
and Meyer, 2011). Institutions develop over time and the institutional transition is ―fundamental 
and comprehensive change introduced to the formal and informal rules of the game that affect 
organizations as players‖ (Peng, 2003, p. 275).  
Institutions continue to remain regulated at the national level, so the changes are 
multidirectional and very slow. It takes decades to create and sustain a certain type of 
institutional system. On the other hand, most countries are now trying to promote economic 
growth through FDI and international trade. However, in a completely liberalized environment 
FDI does not necessarily lead to growth if there is no growth of domestic investment, therefore, 
FDI lead to growth only where the ―domestic investment has the ability to internalize the 
externalities from FDI‖ (Narula, 2015, p.17).   
 
3. FDI and the EU Integrations 
 
Statements about the EU integration process leading to higher living standards, repeated 
innumerable times, are in high discordance with economic evidence
1
 and have only political 
connotations. The period of EU integrations in transition countries in South-East and Eastern 
Europe was characterized by a severe decline in population and a radical increase in 
unemployment and poverty. The analysis below will also show that membership in the EU per 
se, cannot be considered as a location advantage and that institutional convergence that 
creates grounds for approximation of income per capita to the levels of developed European 
economies may be correlated, to some extent, with the free trade area, i.e. the European 
Economic Area (EEA). 
Research about FDI in transition regions has considered its volume, origins, and 
destination according to economic activity. Damijan et al. (2013) suggest that FDI in developing 
European countries have traditionally been accessed as a source of productivity growth and 
export restructuring. Rojec and Penev (2004) see the key positive location advantage in 
transition countries to be high-quality cheap labor. This is very problematic, as high-quality labor 
is by definition not cheap. Moreover, with regional economic integration, particularly in the EU 
that allows free movement of people, cheap labor loses its location-specific characteristic. 
Another argument in favor of EU integrations, in relation to FDI inflows, relies on the fact 
that countries enlarge their market by joining the European Free Trade Area. This is considered 
an important location advantage in Dunning‘s (1993) OLI framework, but nowadays, the EU is 
28 country club that follows the global tendency of trade liberalization in line with WTO rules. 
Moreover, companies in transition countries have built their competencies in the period of 
                                                 
1
 For more information see Institute of Economic Science of Serbia (2012) and World Bank (2015). 
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socialism and can hardly win an open market battle with experienced companies of a developed 
Europe in a single market (Radosevic, 2004). 
The key advantage of cheap labor in transitions countries, which have been identified 
by Rojec and Penev (2004), seems to be outdated nowadays. Local and regional labor markets 
allow employees to look for jobs in countries other than their own. Authors like Narula (2009) 
and Blomstrom and Kokko (2013), clearly argue that developing European countries should 
overcome the low labor cost trap as this kind of location advantage is generic, there is an 
increasing number of countries that can offer exactly the same. Radulescu and Jianu (2011) 
also argue that relying on labor costs and EU integrations for FDI attraction is unsustainable, 
and irrelevant for high-quality investments. Moreover, labor cost is not what makes FDI sticky, it 
is rather labor quality, i.e. its ability to achieve process/product innovations (Narula, 2009). 
At the same time, economic development in transition European economies is, being 
linked not only by government officials but also by some members of the academic community, 
with a country‘s progress in the EU integration process Champion and von Reppert-Bismarck 
(2005). For example, Stosic et al. (2011) suggests that in the last few years, countries like 
Bulgaria and Romania were able to attract more FDI than Serbia, because they were going 
through the EU integration process faster than Serbia. That is why they concluded that Serbia 
needs to be ―brought closer to the European Union‖ in order to improve a business environment 
that will attract foreign investors. 
The data provided in Table 1 below shows that on the World Bank report ―Doing 
Business 2010‖ Serbia rank quite low in the 88
th
 position, whereas Bulgaria and Romania are 
ranked at the 44
th
 and 55
th
 position, respectively. The study indicates how easy it is to start a 
business, get construction permits, employ workers, trade across borders, enforce contracts, 
etc. It is not debatable that Bulgaria and Romania have received a significantly greater amount 
of inward FDI than Serbia, but Serbia has received almost as much inward FDI as Greece (from 
2000 to 2012). Figure 1 below summarizes the average annual FDI inflows for the period 2000-
2014. The figure also shows that Serbia was a more attractive location for FDI than, for 
example, Slovenia or Estonia, which are ranked higher in the ―Doing Business 2010‖ report. 
 
 
Figure 1. Average Annual Net FDI Inflows, 2000-2014 (current US$) 
Source: UNCTAD (2014) 
 
The improvement of the ―ease of doing business indicators‖ is, undoubtedly, important 
for the improvement of the business environment and establishment of efficient institutions. 
However, a broader image unambiguously shows no reason to link improvement of the 
business environment with EU integration. There are at least for two reasons: (1) nation-states 
are sovereign territorial units and implement policies independently of anybody‘s requirement, 
(2) there are cases of the EU members which have considerably lower Doing Business 
indicators than other European countries which are not the EU members (for example, Italy 56
th
, 
Greece 61
st
 versus Norway 6
th
, Switzerland 20
th
). 
If we apply the logic of EU integration being responsible for the improvement of the 
business environment that led to greater FDI inflows in Bulgaria and Romania, then it is 
reasonable to question why this has not been the case in Greece or Italy. As a matter of fact, 
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Italy is ranked at the 56
th
 position in the World Bank‘s ―Doing Business 2015‖ report which is 
behind Bulgaria and Romania. At the same time, inward FDI flows are significantly greater in 
Italy than in Bulgaria and Romania. Table 1 below illustrates country‘s position at the World 
Bank‘s Doing Business ranking and inward/outward FDI flows in 2015. 
 
Table 1. Measuring competitiveness: Italy, Bulgaria, Romania 
Country 
Ease of doing 
business rank 
Inward FDI flows 
(in million US$) 
Outward FDI 
flows (in million 
US$) 
Net Outward 
Investment (NOI) 
position 
Italy 56 11,451 23,451 Positive 
Bulgaria 38 1,733 506 Negative 
Romania 48 3,234 -77 Negative 
Source: World Bank (2014), UNCTAD (2014) 
 
As we can see, among the three EU members, Italy has the lowest rank in easy of 
doing business ranking report, which means that bureaucratic procedures for starting, running 
and closing the business are considerably greater in Italy than in Bulgaria or Romania. 
However, investors have preferred Italy over Bulgaria and Romania for their operations. 
Therefore, we cannot judge on a country‘s ability to attract FDI by looking only at indicators of 
―ease of doing business‖, as this indicator do not represent the quality of institutions. More 
importantly, we can see that the EU membership cannot be linked to a country‘s ability to 
improve its business environment. The country‘s business environment is shaped by overall 
institutional quality, which includes corruption perception and other measures of effective 
governance. It is important that overall institutional environment increases predictability and 
trust, and limits opportunistic behavior (North, 1990). 
The importance of institutional quality for international business is recognized in the IB 
literature, as an important driver of FDI Alfaro et al. (2008). The supporting formal institutions, 
which include laws and regulations, private property, protection and equality of parties in the 
judiciary system, allow businesses to operate at a lower transaction cost, and to invest more 
securely (Van Hoorn and Maseland, 2016). Yet, there is no evidence to consider this type of 
institution-building to be the result of the EU integration process. 
As Radulescu and Jianu (2011) noted, EU countries like Greece, Italy or Spain are 
perfect examples of old EU members which show the complete irrelevance of the EU integration 
process for FDI inflows. Although a steady increase of foreign investments happened in Greece, 
the growth was 10 times slower than in other Mediterranean economies. The reason is that 
institutional development occurred at a different rate in different countries, regardless of the EU 
integrations. Moreover, global trade liberalization and market deregulation allow countries to 
participate in free trade without being members of the EU single market. Therefore, the 
research question in this paper will be: Does amount of inbound FDI in transition countries 
depend on the EU accession? 
 
3.1. Methodology 
 
Building on previous literature that has considered the role of the EU integration process in 
institutional development and thereby FDI attraction, (Oxelheim and Ghauri, 2004; Nakamura et 
al. 2012), we consider data in the World Governance Index (WGI) in 16 Eastern European 
countries
2
. These include countries that are on their way to EU membership, current members 
and non-members. The institutional development in these countries is observed over the period 
from 2002 to 2014, as many countries have become EU members during this period, and some 
countries are still integrating.  
                                                 
2
 The list of countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, FYR Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Greece, Romania, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan 
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However, as the theory of multinational enterprise implies, there are many different 
factors which drive FDI, apart from the institutional development of host countries. According to 
Dunning (1993), location advantages of host countries also include market size, labour wage, 
and openness for trade. Therefore, we include various instrumental variables. The choice of the 
countries is motivated by many commonalities between countries. First of all, there is the 
heritage of a socialist past and institutional similarities. Secondly, there is a policy debate in 
transition regions about the role of EU integrations for FDI. Therefore, the hypothesis is that EU 
accession is not correlated with the amount of inbound FDI. 
A correlation-regression equation (1 and 2) describing the relationship between FDI 
inflows and its determinants (Simelyte, 2013), where t stands for the year, and i – a host 
country: 
 
y (FDI) = f (GDP;LFS,C;ID;IN;LCP)    (1) 
 
y (FDI) = α + β1GDPit + β2 LFSit + β3 Cit + β4 IDit + β5 INit + β6 LCPit                          (2) 
 
where: 
 
GDP - Gross Domestic Product; LFS - Labor Force Size; C - Corruption Perception Index; ID – 
Institutional Development. 
 
3.2. Data and Variables 
 
The empirical analysis in this study is based on panel data of 16 countries over the 13-year 
period 2002–2014 (inclusive) supplied by UNCTAD, World Bank and Transparency International 
(Table 2).  
The dependent variable, collected from the UNCTAD‘s (2014) World Investment Report, 
is an inflow of FDI (millions of US dollars). As control variables, we introduce several measures 
of institutional development, following Van Hoorn and Maseland (2016). Those include: Voice 
and Accountability; Political Stability and Absence of Violence; Government Effectiveness; 
Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; Control of Corruption, all summed up under the World 
Governance Indicator (WGI), where an estimate of governance ranges from approximately -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. We take averages of countries‘ scores on 
these indicators for the period 2002-2014. There is a theoretical grounding, according to 
Dunning (1993), to account for those factors as determinants of FDI. There is also a notion that 
the EU integrations process influences the improvement of those factors (Baldwin et al. 1997). 
We also introduce several control variables to ensure that relevant factors that can influence 
FDI inflows are accounted for. These include the size of a country‘s labor force, GDP per capita 
and corruption perception index. Concerning the EU accession, we have divided countries into 
three groups and created 3 dummy variables (in STATA): for the EU membership variable 
would take ―1‖ (EU-member), all observations before EU accession year are denoted as zero 
(non-member) – ―2‖ and Kazakhstan – ―3‖ as it has no intention to join the EU (Table 3). 
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Table 2. Variables, definitions and data sources. 
Variable Definition Source
3
 
Dependent variable 
Inbound FDI Natural log of total inbound FDI 
received by a country 
UNCTAD (2014) 
www.unctad.org 
 
Independent variables 
The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators 2016: Voice and 
Accountability, Political stability, 
Government effectiveness, 
Regulatory quality, Rule of law, 
Control of corruption 
Averages of countries‘ scores World Bank (2016) 
The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators 
www.govindicators.org 
 
Control variables 
GDP per capita Market opportunity, natural log 
of gross domestic product in 
current international dollars, 
purchasing power parity PPP 
adjusted) 
World Bank (2015) 
www.worldbank.org 
 
Labour force size Natural log of millions people in 
labour 
World Bank (2015) 
www.worldbank.org 
 
Corruption perception index  Averages of countries‘ scores Transparency International 
(2015) 
www.transparency.org 
 
Year dummies Dummy variable used for years 
2002-2014 
- 
EU accession dummies 0 – non-member 
1 – member  
2 - KZ 
 
- 
 
 
Table 3. CEE, Baltic and SEE countries and their year of  
EU accession 
Country Year of EU accession 
Albania recognized candidate 
Bosnia and Herzegovina potential candidate 
Bulgaria 2007 
Croatia 2013 
Czech Republic 2004 
Estonia 2004 
Greece 1981 
Hungary 2004 
Kazakhstan not applicable 
Latvia 2004 
Lithuania 2004 
Montenegro recognized candidate 
Romania 2007 
Serbia recognized candidate 
Slovak Republic 2004 
Slovenia 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 All electronic sources accessed on April 20, 2016. 
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3.3. Analytical methods 
3.3.1. Correlations and multicollinearity 
 
In performing tests to account for the most appropriate econometric model, we consider the 
possibility of multicollinearity. Imperfect multicollinearity occurs when two or more regressors 
are highly correlated (a cut-off point for the correlation coefficient > 0.7). There are particularly 
large, positive and significant correlations between all Worldwide Governance Indicators 2015 
(Table 4): Voice and Accountability, Political stability, Government effectiveness, Regulatory 
quality, Rule of law, Control of corruption, except between Political stability and Voice of 
accountability (0.6156) and Political stability and Corruption perception (0.6773),where the 
correlation is strong but VIF values are less than the 0.7 cut-off point. Based on our calculations 
we excluded all WGI indicators from our model apart from Control of Corruption, and opt to 
keep the Corruption perception index. There is no correlation of Worldwide Governance 
Indicators 2015 with the other variables in our model such as EU accession, GDP, labor force 
size and therefore we have concluded that multicollinearity has no effect on the coefficient 
between iFDI and the fact of EU accession. The characteristics of key variables are presented 
in descriptive statistics (Table 5).  
 
Table 4. Correlation coefficients 
 
 
C Y RL CC RQ PS GE VA LFS CP EUa GDP 
 
iFDI 
C 1.000             
Y 0.000 1.000            
RL 0.198 0.148 1.000           
CC 0.213 0.006 0.912 1.000          
RQ 0.071 0.082 0.915 0.831 1.000         
PS 0.262 0.004 0.754 0.689 0.758 1.000        
GE 0.237 0.237 0.933 0.876 0.890 0.806 1.000       
VA 0.162 0.034 0.873 0.868 0.856 0.620 0.840 1.000      
LFS 0.108 0.007 0.214 0.347 0.144 0.067 0.276 0.349 1.000     
CP 0.143 0.289 0.826 0.848 0.793 0.681 0.787 0.699 0.239 1.000    
EUa 0.180 0.276 0.275 0.103 0.269 0.336 0.247 0.077 0.436 0.272 1.000   
GDP 0.242 0.476 0.730 0.561 0.605 0.614 0.714 0.465 0.129 0.637 0.626 1.000  
iFDI 0.009 0.046 0.108 0.198 0.030 0.071 0.102 0.262 0.645 0.094 0.410 0.178 1.000 
Note: C- Country, Y – Year, RL – Rule of law, CC – Control of corruption, RQ – Regulatory quality, PS – Political 
stability, GE – Government effectiveness, VA- Voice and accountability, LFS – Labour force size, CP – corruption 
perception, EUa – EU accession, GDP – GDP per capita, iFDI – inflow Foreign Direct investments 
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FDI 208 2832.433 3237.822 -476 14375 
Nonmember 208 0.4182 0.4944 0 1 
KZ 208 0.0625 0.2426 0 1 
GDP per capita 208 17457.56 6975.707 4785.9 31185.9 
ln LFS 208 14.6035 0.9385 12.40395 16.1529 
GE 208 0.3267 0.5837 -0.97 1.19 
CC 208 0.0228 0.5100 -1.1 1.27 
 
 
3.3.2. Analytical models and robustness tests 
 
First, we defined panel data by using command ―xtreg‖ with the option ―fe‖ to perform fixed 
effect regression in STATA (Table 6). 
 
 
 
 
Delevic and Heim / Eurasian Journal of Economics and Finance, 5(1), 2017, 16-32 
 
 
 
25 
 
Table 6. Panel data definition and coefficients for the within-subjects (fixed-effects) 
variables 
FDI Coef. Std. Err. t P>ItI 95% Conf. Interval 
Nonmember 517.9137 677.8615 0.76 0.446 -819.9223 1855.75 
KZ Omitted because of collinearity 
GDP per 
capita 
-0.10284 0.1094 -0.94 0.349 -0.3188 0.1131 
lnLFS 21174.67 5287.914 4.00 0.000 10738.38 31610.97 
GE -1068.917 1427.26 -0.75 0.455 -3885.775 1747.942 
CC 2356.889 1340.93 1.76 0.081 -289.5877 5003.365 
_cons -306175.9 76784.8 -3.99 0.000 -457719.3 -154632.5 
Notes: sigma_u: 18134.691; sigma_e: 1973.2339, rho: 0.98829894 (fraction of variance due to u_i); Fixed-effects 
(within regression), Number of observations – 208, Group variable – country, Number of groups – 16, R-sq: within = 
0.3207, between = 0.6466, overall = 0.3759, Number of groups – 16, Obs per group:min = 13, avg = 13.0, max = 13, 
F (17,175) = 4.86, Prob > F = 0.0000.  
 
Second, we get both the within and between effects with a xtreg-re command (Table 7): 
 
Table 7. Panel data definition and coefficients for the within-subjects (fixed-effects) and 
between-subjects effect variables. 
FDI Coef. Std. Err. z P>IzI 95% Conf. Interval 
Nonmember 973.475 598.4392 1.63 0.104 -199.4443 2146.394 
KZ 5351.083 1652.113 3.24 0.001 2113.001 8589.165 
GDP per 
capita 
-0.0289 0.0806133 -0.36 0.719 -0.1869 0.129 
lnLFS 1997.312 396.914 5.03 0.000 1219.38 2775.148 
GE 143.7223 1004.031 0.14 0.886 -1824.143 2111.687 
CC 1227.017 1073.196 1.15 0.252 -874.4093 3332.443 
_cons -28209.88 5713.714 -4.94 0.000 -39408.55 -17011.21 
Notes: sigma_u: 1139.5346; sigma_e : 1973.2339 ; rho: 0.25009462 (fraction of variance due to u_i). Random-
effects GLS regression; Number of observations – 208; Group variable – country Number of groups – 16; R-sq: 
within = 0.2651Obs per group:min = 13; between = 0.8119, avg = 13.0, overall = 0.5589, max = 13, Wald chi2 (18) = 
107.60, Corr (u_i, X) = 0 (assumed), Prob > chi2 = 0.0000. 
 
To decide between fixed or random effects we have run a Hausman test where the null 
hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effects vs. the alternative the fixed effects 
(Table 8). 
 
Table 8. Hausman test. 
 Coefficients 
(b) 
fe 
(B) 
re 
(b-B)  
Difference 
Sqrt (diag 
(V_b-V_B) 
S.E. 
Nonmember 517.9137 973.375 -455.5614 318.3815 
GDP per capita -0.1028 -0.0289 -0.0738 0.074 
lnLFS 21174.67 1997.312 19177.36 5273.001 
GE -1068.917 143.7223 -1212.639 -1014.393 
CC 2356.889 1229.017 1127.872 803.9548 
Notes: Test: H0: difference in coefficients not systematic; Prob>chi2 = 0.4051 > 0.05 (i.e. not significant), therefore 
we use random effects model. 
 
3.4. Results 
 
The findings of this research make two important contributions. First of all, we reaffirm the 
relevance of institutions for FDI. Secondly, from an empirical perspective, the period of the EU 
integration process was not characterized by substantial improvement of governance indicators 
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in the transition region. Moreover, we can see that institutional improvements and increased FDI 
inflows happened in countries which are not intending to join the EU. This is a clear suggestion 
that internal economic and political reforms in sovereign states are the only ones that matter for 
institutional development, thus attracting more FDI. Similarly to Radulescu and Jianu (2011), 
who excluded the role of the EU in the attraction of FDI for Romania, results of this research 
suggest that transition European economies are capable of improving institutional efficiency, 
and attract more FDI regardless of their EU aspirations.  
The case of Kazakhstan is an example of a country which is not an EU-member and is 
not going to access the EU in the future. However, it adopted a variety of new legislative norms, 
and in comparison with new EU members, nevertheless substantially increased the amount of 
inward FDI in the last 15 years, as illustrated by our data and results.  
 
3.5. Limitations 
 
Our data did not include measures of discrimination or incentives for FDI. Those factors, 
combined with other relevant determinants of FDI, may have important implications for location 
choices of MNEs. Furthermore, research can be further extended by an observation of FDI 
performance in other European countries which are not in the EU integration process.  
 
4. The Role of FDI in Transition Economies 
 
Although we considered the amount of FDI inflows in relation to the improvement of certain 
institutional factors, we did not consider the quality of investments. The transition economies 
experienced FDI inflows and certain institutional reform during their EU integrations, but this has 
been the scenario in the non-EU countries as well. The question of the influence of the FDI on 
economic growth and development is a separate one and should be considered in the context 
of the participation of the local business in the MNE production network. 
As shown by Narula and Guimon (2010) the role of the state is to create a network of 
supporting business environment, that include the availability of research institutes and 
competitive suppliers which can create linkages with MNEs. This is how domestic firms can 
benefit from the spillover effect and MNE positive externalities,
4
 direct and indirect. This is what 
we consider to be the role of government in the embodiment step.  
However, MNEs are not ready to expose their ownership advantages to local 
competitors as this is fundamental for their competitiveness. MNEs are ready to outsource only 
what they can afford to lose. Therefore, the role of policy makers is essential in supporting the 
greater availability of innovative organization and production processes. Transition countries 
have shown very low adaptability to the needs of technologically advanced MNEs, and are 
stuck in low value adding production.  
Finally, the main point of the attraction of FDI is to make foreign companies stick to the 
local environment. Therefore, in the aftercare process, governments have to ensure 
sustainability of foreign investment process and benefits for the host country. As much as 
globalization has made internationalization of production easy it is also easy to leave countries 
and move production to new places. 
 
5. Sourcing benefits from FDI in Kazakhstan 
 
Kazakhstan is an export-oriented country with oil and gas industry increasingly dominating its 
economy. Therefore, a major part of inward FDI investments is concentrated in this sector of the 
economy. As the oil and gas projects can be very investments intensive, since obtaining 
independence, the government of Kazakhstan has adopted a series of reforms to liberalize its 
economy and facilitate foreign investment, first of all in the oil and gas sector. Figure 2 shows a 
steady increase in inward FDI measures year by year in the period between 2002 and 2014. In 
                                                 
4
 Note: Externalities influence every economic unit, but spillover effects pertain only companies that have 
direct links with MNEs (suppliers, distributors, and etc.) 
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order to diversify its economic structure, Kazakhstan has embarked on an ambitious program of 
diversification, innovation, investment in human capital, international trade and FDI attraction for 
job creation (UNCTAD, 2013).  
 
 
Figure 2. FDI in Kazakhstan in 2002 – 2014 
Source: UNCTAD (2014) 
  
However, Kazakhstan shows awareness of the potential negative effects of FDI, 
especially as motives for FDI in Kazakhstan are resource-seeking (Tordo et al. 2013). The FDI 
in the host country may crowd out the domestic firms, and thus have destructive effects on the 
level of employment and profits in that country (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2006). For example, 
Aitken and Harrison (1999) found that increases in resource-seeking FDI negatively affected the 
productivity of domestically owned firms in the same industry. This result may explain in part 
why governments in host countries are so interested in policies that could protect domestic 
industries. On the other hand, any restriction on the use of inputs is clearly detrimental to 
efficiency. Therefore, the level of local content restrictions should be negotiated with all 
stakeholders (Ado, 2013).  
The motive of the recent rise in protectionism – what has been termed ―global 
protectionism‖ in the name of nations - and even nationalization of resource-based industries 
(―resource nationalism‖) such as oil in countries like Kazakhstan or Russia (restrictions on 
foreign investment in the energy sector) appears to be an intention to capture a greater share of 
value, or to use energy revenues to rebuild the broader economy (Enderwick, 2011 and Mares, 
2010).  
There is no one generally accepted definition of local content policy (LCP) and often 
different companies and countries employ different measurements for it. Richardson (1993, 
p.12) defined LC plans as a requirement ―that a firm must use a certain ‗amount‘ of domestically 
produced inputs in producing its final output‖. We broadly understand under the term "local 
content", the wealth shared with the national economy from the purchase of goods and 
services, including wages and benefits, materials, equipment and plant, subcontracts and taxes 
(Warner, 2011). Through LC in the oil and gas industries, policy-makers particularly understand 
value-added activities in which local business competes for subcontracts or service contracts, 
as well as broader ―social‖ participation by the foreign investors‖ (Kalyuzhnova, 2008).  The 
modern definition of LC assumes that it is ―an industrial tool that can enable domestic producers 
to expand their activities, at least partially with domestic inputs, and gain access to international 
technological and managerial expertise… [in order to] enhance their competitiveness‖ 
(Kalyuzhnova et al. 2016, p3). 
There are different development objectives and reasons why countries implement 
performance requirements, and therefore arguments for protection. For example, Reinert (2007) 
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has shown how rich countries have developed through a combination of government 
intervention, protectionism, and strategic investment - rather than through free trade.  
The main argument in favor of protection is support of infant industries – domestic 
competitive industry experiencing dynamic learning effects external to firms, and competing with 
mature foreign industry producing an imperfect substitute for the domestic goods. Imposed 
protection must be temporary and the emerging industry must then mature and become viable 
to survive on its own (Melitz, 2005 and Enderwick, 2011). Historically, this argument was used 
by the United States as it sought to industrialize in the face of British dominance of world trade 
and, more recently, by both Japan and South Korea as they sought to become global 
competitors.  
The LC schemes refer to those of the areas of the theory of protection (Vousden, 1987), 
based on the early theoretical analyses of content protection made by Wonnacott and 
Wonnacott (1967) and Munk (1969). Grossman (1981) proposed a content protection scheme 
which requires that a given percentage of domestic value added or domestic components 
should be embodied in a specified final product. This model considers a domestic goods sector 
purchasing from an intermediate sector, either nationally or importing from abroad. Grossman 
(1981) found, that the degree of protection is variable and difficult to predict and because of this, 
content protection ―may fail to attain the noneconomic objectives of the policy maker‖.  
According to Johnson (1960), non-economic objectives are ―objectives of various kinds, 
identified in one way or another with the effects of the tariff on domestic production and 
consumption of certain products‖. He identified five non-economic objectives: national self-
sufficiency and independence achieved through an increase in the proportion of consumption 
supplied from domestic production. The diversification, industrialization, or agriculturalization 
leading to an increase in production in the supporting industries. The promotion of farming as ―a 
desirable way of life‖ implying subsidizing employment in this sector. The military preparedness 
expressed in maintaining a higher level of domestic production of certain strategic commodities. 
The bargaining, i.e. inflicting economic damage upon another country or countries in order to 
obtain advantageous tariff concessions. Since these researchers, the limited theoretical 
literature on content protection has been developed: for example, Davidson et al. (1985) 
investigated the interrelation between the impact of foreign investments on welfare, output and 
employment in the host country and the level of LC requirements. He has argued that local 
requirements to some point are the source of host country‘s welfare, output and employment. 
Kazakhstan started to support and develop local content in the oil and gas industry 
since the declaration of its independence in 1990
th 
years. The first version of the Subsoil Use 
Law which required applicants in tender proposals to set out their proposed obligations to 
engage a certain percentage of goods, works and services of Kazakhstan-origin and 
Kazakhstani personnel was introduced in 1996. 
With the introduction of the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On subsoil and subsoil 
use" (Kazakhstan Republican Center of Legal Information, 2016) in 2010, LCPs in Kazakhstan 
include procurement, labor and technology transfer policies and social projects. Although there 
are some challenges associated with the implementation of the local policies in Kazakhstan, 
and local capacity still remains low (Kalyuzhnova et al. 2016), recent researches (Azhgaliyeva 
et al. 2016) demonstrate, that LCP has a positive effect on local economy. For instance, it is 
strongly associated with firm competitiveness and the decisions to export and LCP may also 
foster firm competitiveness under a set of conditions (Veloso, 2008). 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper was to challenge the contemporary view of policy makers in transition 
countries, which try to justify their EU integrations with the expectation of greater FDI inflows, 
which are expected to have positive developmental effects. As theoretical arguments and 
empirical data have shown, investment decisions of MNEs are driven by factors which are 
divorced from integrations in any political unions. 
Overall, the theoretical arguments suggest that there are certain location-specific 
advantages of host countries which drive FDI movements. However, these can hardly be 
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associated with the EU integration process and many transition economies were unsuccessful 
in FDI coordination despite EU integrations. On the other hand, the attracted FDI have had 
limited developmental effects due to, inter alia, inadequate linkages between domestic and 
foreign enterprises i.e. due to lack of local content policies.  
There is no reason to believe that foreign investors would not to invest in transition 
countries if they were not on the EU path, as long as they are dedicated to the implementation 
of internal institutional reforms. 
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